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I. INTRODUCTION
Violent crime involving the use of firearms has risen dramati-
cally during the past few decades.1 Recent congressional efforts to ad-
dress this problem have focused almost exclusively on gun control as
the appropriate solution, leading to the imposition of waiting periods
for the purchase of firearms and complete bans on the production of
certain assault weapons. Attempting to remove firearms from the
hands of criminals, however, is not an exclusive remedy.
One of the natural companion measures to gun control is the
imposition of severe sentences for the use of firearms during the
commission of violent felonies. Congress adopted this approach with
1. FBI crime statistics show that the number of murders, aggravated assaults, and
robberies committed with firearms increased 97.9% between 1974 and 1994. Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Program Support Section of the Criminal Justice Information Services Division,
Uniform Crime Reporting Database (data on file with the Author).
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the enactment of 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)2 as part of the Gun Control
Act of 1968. Section 924(c) could be an important weapon in the
prosecutor's legal arsenal, but disagreement over key provisions of the
statute has reduced its effectiveness. Congress has amended the
statute six times,3 and disagreements over its interpretation have
reached the Supreme Court on five occasions.4
2. The statute in its current form provides:
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime
(including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides for an enhanced
punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for
which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm,
shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug traffick-
ing crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a short-bar-
reled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment
for ten years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped
with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years. In the case
of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shal be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for twenty years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a de-
structive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to life impris-
onment without release. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shal not
place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of a violation of this
subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run con-
currently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or carried.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994 ed.).
3. Congress amended section 924(c) in 1971, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, and 1994. The 1971
amendments reduced the minimum sentence for a second or subsequent offense from five to two
years, and provided that a sentence could not run concurrently with any sentence imposed for
the underlying offense. Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-644, tit. II, § 13, 84
Stat. 1890 (1971). The 1984 amendments clarified that section 924(c) applies even where the
penalties for the underlying crime may be enhanced when the crime is committed with a
firearm, specifically responding to the Supreme Coures holdings in Simpson v. United States
and Busic v. United States, see note 4; imposed uniform sentences of five years for a first
conviction and ten years for a second or subsequent conviction; and provided that a court may
not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person convicted under section 924(c).
Continuing Appropriations, 1985-Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, ch. 10, § 1005(a), 98 Stat. 2138-39 (1984). The 1986 amendments increased the penalties
and broadened the application of section 924(c) to include drug trafficking crimes and crimes
committed with machine guns and silencers. Firearm Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
308, § 104(a)(2), 100 Stat. 457 (1986). The 1988 amendments increased the penalties for a
section 924(c) violation. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6460, 102 Stat.
4181, 4373. The 1990 amendments also increased penalties and added short-barreled rifles,
sawed-off shotguns, and destructive devices to the list of penalized firearms. Crime Control Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, §§ 1101, 3527, 104 Stat. 4829, 4924 (1990). The 1994 amendment
added semiautomatic assault weapons to the list of specifically identified firearms. Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XI, § 110102(c)(2),
108 Stat. 1998 (1994).
4. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1978) (holding that the government could
not charge a defendant for violating the original section 924(c) where the statute proscribing the
predicate offense already provided for increased penalties when the offense was committed with
a firearm); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1980) (holding that where the statute
proscribing the predicate offense provided for increased penalties when the offense was
committed with a firearm, the defendant must be sentenced under that statute and not section
924(c)); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 137 (1993) (holding that convictions and sentences
SECTION 924(C)
Recently, a new question regarding the interpretation of
section 924(c) has split the federal circuit courts. That divisive
question is the meaning of the statutory phrase "whoever, during and
in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime... uses
or carries a firearm."5 This language "may mean either that (1) each
time a defendant uses [or carries] a firearm in relation to a crime he
commits a separate crime, or (2) that if during the course of a crime a
defendant uses [or carries] a firearm at any time, he commits a
[single] separate crime."6 The resolution of this issue has obvious
implications for the effectiveness of section 924(c) as a deterrent to
firearm use, especially since the penalties for violating section 924(c)
become more severe as the act is repeated. 7
This Note argues that the majority of circuit courts misinter-
pret section 924(c), preventing the statute from having its full deter-
rent effect. Part II briefly discusses the origin of the statute. Part III
outlines the various approaches that the circuit courts have taken
when determining whether multiple section 924(c) violations may be
linked to a single predicate offense. Part IV analyzes these ap-
proaches, considering especially the statutory text and the purpose of
the statute, and concludes that section 924(c) proscribes, as a distinct
criminal offense, each separate use of a firearm during and in relation
to the commission of a federal felony.
II. AN ENIGMATIC ENACTMENT
A dramatic increase in the number of crimes committed with
firearms during the late 1960s 8 produced a congressional consensus
for second and subsequent violations of section 924(c) may be imposed during the same
prosecution); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993) (holding that exchanging a
firearm for drugs constitutes a use of the firearm within the meaning of section 924(c)); Bailey v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 507-08, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995) (holding that only conduct
involving the active employment of a firearm constitutes a use of the firearm within the
meaning of section 924(c)).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
6. United States v. Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 542, 133 L. Ed. 2d 445 (1995).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
8. See State Firearms Control Assistance Act of 1968, H.R. Rep. No. 90-1577, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4413 ('Handguns, rifles, and shotguns
have been the chosen means to execute three-quarters of a million people in the United States
since 1900. The use of firearms in violent crimes continues to increase today. Statistics indi-
cate that 50 lives are destroyed by firearms each day. In the 13 months ending in September
1967 guns were involved in more than 6,500 murders, 10,000 suicides, 2,600 accidental deaths,
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that greater federal involvement in law enforcement and gun control
was necessary. Congress therefore enacted the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.9 Ironically, the Omnibus Act
passed on the day of Robert F. Kennedy's assassination, a coincidence
which strengthened the demand to impose stronger sentences on
those who used firearms to commit crimes. 10 Just four days later,
Congress amended Title IV of the Omnibus Act, which contained a
new chapter of the United States Code dealing with firearms, with
the Gun Control Act of 1968.11
The provision that became section 924(c) was inserted as a
substitute floor amendment to the Gun Control Act during final pas-
sage in the House. 12 It focused on the use of firearms in the commis-
sion of federal crimes and provided in part:
Whoever-
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony
which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment .... 13
Soon after the House passed the amendment, a similar
amendment was offered in the Senate.14 Though it apparently ad-
43,500 aggravated assaults, and 50,000 robberies. No civilized society can ignore the malig-
nancy which this senseless slaughter reflects.").
9. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968), codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S. Code.
10. See Simpson, 435 U.S. at 18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (commenting that "Senator
Kennedy's assassination... obviously focused the attention of Congress on the problem of
firearms control"); United States v. Hill, 971 F.2d 1461, 1472 (10th Cir. 1992) (Moore, J., dis-
senting) (stating that following Senator Kennedy's assassination, the demand for harsher
penalties "became more urgent").
11. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
12. The substitute amendment was offered by Representative Poff, who sought to
strengthen a gun control measure already presented on the House floor. 114 Cong. Rec. 22,231
(July 19, 1968).
13. The original version of section 924(c) incorporated this language verbatim. It stated:
Whoever-
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the
United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony which may
be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than
ten years. In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such
person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than five years nor
more than [twenty-five] years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
court shall not suspend the sentence of such person or give him a probationary sentence.
Gun Control Act of 1968, 82 Stat. at 1224.
SECTION 924(C)
dressed the same concerns as the House amendment, the language
and approach of the Senate measure differed markedly, emphasizing
the commission of the underlying felony. It provided in part:
"Whoever, while engaged in the commission of any offense which is a
crime of violence punishable under this title, is armed with any fire-
arm, may in addition to the punishment provided for the crime be
punished by imprisonment... ,,15
The hurried consideration and insertion of these amendments
resulted in the absence of committee hearings or reports on either
measure. Other than statements made by legislators on the floor, the
report of the Conference Committee provides the only information
concerning the enactment of section 924(c). The report states that the
conference substitute is identical to the measure that originated in
the House. 16 However, neither the statements of the legislators nor
the conference committee report directly addresses whether section
924(c) allows multiple convictions and sentences in relation to a single
underlying felony.
III. INTERPRETIVE INCONSISTENCY
The federal courts of appeal that have directly confronted this
issue have settled into two opposing groups. Each group, in turn, has
articulated two interpretations of section 924(c) to support its conclu-
sion.
14. Senator Dominick sponsored this amendment and emphasized the "commonsense of
[its] approach" to the imposition of penalties for the criminal use of a firearm. 114 Cong. Rec.
27,142 (Sept. 17, 1968).
15. Id.
16. Gun Control Act of 1968, H.R. Cond Rep. No. 90-1956, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1968),
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4431. The version of section 924(c) adopted by the
Conference Committee differed from the Poff Amendment in two respects. The prohibitions on
suspension of sentence and probation were applicable only to second and subsequent convic-
tions, and concurrent sentencing was not prohibited. Id. This pronouncement by the
Conference Committee is especially significant because "[t]he report of a joint conference
committee of both Houses of Congress... is accorded a good deal more weight than the remarks
even of the sponsor of a particular portion of a bill on the floor of the chamber." Simpson, 435
U.S. at 17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Part IV.
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A. The Predicate Offense Test and the Rule of Lenity
The majority of federal courts advocate what is loosely termed
the "predicate offense test." This view holds that a single underlying
felony can serve as the basis of only one section 924(c) violation and
conviction.17
Some of the predicate offense courts reason that section 924(c)
focuses on firearms only to the extent that a defendant uses them
"during and in relation to" the underlying felony. 18 They conclude
that because the statute emphasizes the relationship between the
firearms and the underlying felony, the underlying felony is the
proper unit of prosecution. 19 Thus, the number of times a single fire-
arm is used during the commission of the predicate offense is irrele-
vant. The number of firearms used likewise has no bearing on the
application of section 924(c) under this line of reasoning.20
Other courts conclude that it is unclear whether Congress
intended to punish a defendant multiple times for each firearm
possessed or each separate firearm use, or to punish the defendant
only once for the continuing act of using firearms during the
commission of the underlying offense.21 Because section 924(c)
imposes severe penalties in multiple convictions, these courts apply
the rule of lenity in favor of the defendant. 2
17. See, for example, United States v. Lindsay, 985 F.2d 666, 676 (2nd Cir. 1993); United
States v. Privette, 947 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937,
942-45 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Nabors, 901 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (6th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 737-38 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Sims, 975 F.2d 1225, 1233
(6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Taylor, 13 F.3d 986, 992-93 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Cappas, 29 F.3d 1187, 1189 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jackson, 65 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir.
1995); United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Henning,
906 F.2d 1392, 1398-99 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 1089, 1092-93 (10th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Moore, 958 F.2d 310, 314 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Hamilton, 953 F.2d 1344, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 1992).
18. Lindsay, 985 F.2d at 675; Taylor, 13 F.3d at 993.
19. Lindsay, 985 F.2d at 673.
20. United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (panel decision)
(Silberman, J., dissenting in part).
21. Lindsay, 985 F.2d at 675.
22. Id. at 676. The essence of the predicate offense test is that a person cannot be pun-
ished more than once for violating section 924(c). The concern, therefore, appears to be con-
nected with double jeopardy principles. The Supreme Court has held that "[w]ith respect to
cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than
prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature in-
tended." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). Double jeopardy concerns, then, are not
independent of the statutory interpretation involved. A determination of the proper unit of
prosecution will also resolve any double jeopardy issues in sentencing under section 924(c).
SECTION 924(C)
B. Separate Guns and Separate Uses
Courts adopting the minority view allow multiple violations of
section 924(c) to be linked to a single underlying felony.23 These
courts find no ambiguity in the statute and reject the predicate of-
fense test as illogical.24
One circuit has held that section 924(c) clearly establishes the
firearm as the object of the statute and, therefore, the appropriate
unit of prosecution.25 According to this analysis, a statute that pref-
aces the object of the offense with the word "a" unambiguously
authorizes only singular units of prosecution. 26 A defendant, then,
violates section 924(c) as many times as he possesses an additional
gun during and in relation to a single underlying felony.27
Other courts have held that the language of section 924(c)
criminalizes neither the underlying felony nor the simple possession
of a firearm.28 They reason that the statute proscribes, as a separate
offense, the use of a firearm during and in relation to the predicate
offense. 29 According to this analysis, each separate deployment of a
firearm is a violation of section 924(c), even where all such deploy-
ments occur during the course of a single continuing underlying fel-
ony. 30 These courts stress that only the separate use approach
achieves the asserted purpose of section 924(c) and enables the stat-
ute to create its full deterrent effect.3 '
23. See, for example, United States v. Camps, 32 F.3d 102, 106 (4th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1118, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1082 (1995); United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1222-
23 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 388-90 (8th Cir. 1991).
24. See Freisinger, 937 F.2d at 389 ('The plain language of [section 924(c)] lead[s]
inexorably to the conclusion that the statute suffers from no ambiguity, either real or
contrived."); Camps, 32 F.3d at 109 (stating that the "view that [section 924(c)] is ambiguous on
the question must fail as well, since ambiguity certainly cannot be created by imposing on a
statute a reading unsupported by either text or logic").
25. Freisinger, 937 F.2d at 390.
26. Id. at 389. Freisinger appears to be an anomaly. No other circuit has ever concluded
that the firearm is the object, or appropriate unit of prosecution, of section 924(c). The Eighth
Circuit itself, though not overruling the decision, has never cited it as authority in a later case.
In fact, it does not appear that Freisinger has ever been cited with approval.
27. Id. at 390.
28. Camps, 32 F.3d at 108; Lucas, 932 F.2d at 1222-23.
29. Camps, 32 F.3d at 107; Lucas, 932 F.2d at 1223.
30. Camps, 32 F.3d at 107.
31. Id. at 108.
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C. The Latest Word: United States v. Anderson
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, sitting en banc, recently addressed this specific question of
interpretation in United States v. Anderson.32 Its opinions provide the
most detailed and sophisticated consideration of section 924(c).
1. The Facts of the Case
For years, Marcos Anderson spearheaded an extensive narcot-
ics distribution network in the Washington, D.C. area.33 He bought
drugs from suppliers in cities throughout the country and controlled
five distribution centers in Washington D.C., Maryland, and
Virginia.34 On two separate occasions Anderson sent armed co-con-
spirators to Los Angeles to rob one of his cocaine suppliers. 35 Both
robbery attempts failed when FBI agents intercepted and arrested the
men.3 6 Two months after the second robbery attempt, the police
raided two of Anderson's distribution centers, arrested Anderson, and
seized guns from both locations37
At trial, Anderson was convicted of conspiracy to distribute
and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. 38 He was also
convicted of four violations of section 924(c), all linked to the same
underlying drug conspiracy. 39 A divided panel of the appellate court
rejected Anderson's double jeopardy challenge to the multiple section
924(c) convictions and affirmed his sentence.4° After a rehearing en
banc, limited to the question of whether multiple section 924(c)
32. 59 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 542, 133 L. Ed. 2d 445
(1995).





38. Id. at 1324.
39. Two of the section 924(c) counts related to the firearms seized during the unsuccessful
robbery attempts. The other two were based on firearms recovered from each of the distribution
centers raided by the police. Id. at 1324-25.
40. The majority adopted the separate use approach:
We begin, therefore, with the text of the statute, which is quite clear: it proscribes the
use or carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense.
Anderson used a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense on at least four sepa-
rate occasions, to further four distinct purposes. No amount of sophisticated analysis
can avoid the conclusion that he thereby violated [section 924(c)] four times, and there-
fore can be convicted and sentenced four times.
Anderson, 39 F.3d at 354 (panel decision).
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SECTION 924(C)1
violations may be linked to a single predicate offense, however, the
court reversed all but one of Anderson's convictions. 41
2. The Majority Opinion
The Anderson majority observed that section 924(c) constitutes
a separate and distinct offense, rather than a penalty enhancement.
42
It rejected the notion, however, that as separate offenses, multiple
section 924(c) violations automatically could be linked to a single
underlying felony. Instead, it held that the statute has a hybrid char-
acter,43 and that it creates a distinct crime proscribing a course of
conduct or the state of being armed.44 Consequently, the court
reasoned, a defendant can violate section 924(c) only once during and
in relation to a single predicate offense.
The majority's sophisticated analysis relied upon both textual
arguments and interpretations of the sparse legislative history of
section 924(c). First, it noted the juxtaposition of "uses" with "carries"
in the statute and stated that "carries" implies a continuing activity.
4
The majority reasoned that if Congress did not intend a section 924(c)
violation to occur each time a defendant carried a firearm during a
single underlying felony, it would not have intended each deployment
of a firearm in the same context to be a violation of the statute.46
Therefore, "use" for purposes of section 924(c) must mean use at any
time during the commission of the predicate offense. 47
The majority also emphasized the use of definite articles in the
statute. For example, one clause provides for increased penalties "if
the firearm is a machinegun." 48 According to the majority, Congress
employed definite articles in drafting section 924(c) because it did not
regard as significant either the number of firearms used or the num-
ber of times a single firearm was used during a single predicate
41. Anderson, 59 F.3d at 1333, 1334.
42. Id. at 1326 ("[A] [section 924(c)] conviction stands on its own").
43. Id. This "hybrid character" arises from the fact that the government must present
sufficient evidence to prove the predicate offense as an element of the section 924(c) violation,
even if the defendant is eventually acquitted of that predicate offense. Id.
44. Id. at 1331.
45. Id. at 1327.
46. Id.
47. The court stated that the specific act interpretation of "uses" "would be stronger if the
statute employed 'use' as a noun, such that 'a use' of a gun in relation to a drug crime would be
a violation of [section 924(c)]." Id. at 1326.
48. Id. at 1327.
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crime. 49 Instead, Congress envisioned a single section 924(c) violation
once a defendant used a firearm at any time during the commission of
the underlying felony.50 The purpose of section 924(c), therefore, is to
punish a defendant more severely for an underlying crime whose
character irrevocably changes once the defendant uses a firearm.51
The majority next sought to buttress its textual analysis with
the legislative history of section 924(c) and statements made by
Representative Poff, the statute's sponsor. Representative Poff stated
that the "prosecution for the basic felony and the prosecution under
[section 924(c)] would constitute one proceeding out of which two
separate penalties may grow."52 Because the statute's sponsor only
mentioned the existence of two penalties, the majority concluded that
a defendant can violate section 924(c) only once during a single crime.
The majority also noted Representative Poffs remark that section
924(c) was designed to "persuade the man who is tempted to commit a
Federal felony to leave his gun at home."5 3 Consequently, a complete
section 924(c) violation occurs-the persuasion fails-once the defen-
dant uses a firearm.54
Despite the force of its arguments in favor of the predicate
offense test,55 the majority ultimately concluded that section 924(c) is
ambiguous. 56 It therefore applied the rule of lenity and held that only





52. Id. (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 22,232 (July 19, 1968)).
53. Id. at 1327-28 (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 22,231 (July 19, 1968)).
54. Id. at 1328.
55. The majority also attacked the viability of the separate use analysis, stating that it
would "prove devilishly difficult analytically to determine on which occasions and in what
circumstances during an ongoing conspiracy... a defendant was guilty of another separate and
distinct 'use' or 'carry.'" This analytical difficulty would be avoided if "Congress intended [the
court] to ask only whether the defendant at any time used or carried a firearm," because, in that
case, section 924(c) would be properly applied without regard to a determination of when a
separate use occurred. Id. at 1331-33.
56. Id. at 1333.
57. Id. at 1334. Although they signed the coures opinion, two judges concurred in the
result, clearly invoking the rule of lenity. This highlights the fact that only the decision to apply
the rule of lenity received the support of a majority of the court. One concurring opinion stated
that there was no apparent "principled basis upon which to choose between [the] competing
interpretations," and that "the rule of lenity provides the only basis for decision." Id. at 1334
(Buckley, J., concurring). The second concurrence commented:
The Oracle at Delphi would have been proud of [section 924(c)]. The statute yields
barely a clue about how to apply it to drug dealers who routinely arm themselves as
they go about their awful business and, when caught, are charged only with one continu-
1586 [Vol. 49:1577
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3. The Dissent
The dissent also began its analysis by determining that section
924(c) is not merely a penalty enhancement, but a separate offense
that criminalizes the use of a firearm during the commission of the
predicate offense.58 Because the statute defines a separate and
distinct criminal act, a defendant necessarily commits a new section
924(c) violation each time he engages in the proscribed conduct. 59 The
dissent acknowledged that the firearm must be used in connection
with the underlying felony but held that this requirement did not
alter the appropriate unit of prosecution from the use of a firearm to
the predicate offense.60
The dissent supported its interpretation of section 924(c) with
a number of decisions dealing with the question of precisely what act
a statute criminalizes.61 It concluded that the determining factor is
ing drug offense. Reading and rereading my colleagues' skillful efforts to parse the lan-
guage only plunges me deeper into the fog [and] the rule of lenity is... the one path out.
Id. at 1335 (Randolph, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 1336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1338 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the "rule that a crime is
committed each time a defendant performs the proscribed act is so obvious that courts rarely
pause to comment upon it." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent then used the following
hypothetical to prove its point:
Consider a variation on [section 924(c)] simply making the use of a firearm a crime; the
proposition that each separate use would be a separate violation of the statute would
scarcely warrant any mention. That [section 924(c)] narrows the prohibited conduct to
the use of a firearm in connection with another criminal offense does not alter the ap-
propriate unit of prosecution .... [T]he requirement that the defendanes use of a fire-
arm take place in connection with a drug-trafficking crime merely reflects the
Congress's intention to single out as federal offenses those uses of a gun.., and not oth-
ers.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1337 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent relied on a long line of older
Supreme Court decisions, most importantly the decision of the Court in Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The statute at issue in Blockburger, the Harrison Narcotic Act,
provided that "[it shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute any
of the aforesaid drugs" except subject to certain restrictions. Id. at 300. The Court rejected the
defendant's contention that two sales made to the same purchaser with no substantial interval
of time between them constituted a single, continuing offense. Id. at 301, 304. Instead, the
Court held that each of the sales was a distinct offense, stating that "when the impulse is single,
but one indictment lies, no matter how long the action may continue. If successive impulses are
separately given, even though all unite in swelling a common stream of action, separate
indictments lie." Id. at 302 (citation omitted). The two circuits that adopted the separate use
interpretation of section 924(c) also relied on the Blockburger analysis in holding that the
statute prohibits separate "impulses" rather than a course of conduct. Lucas, 932 F.2d at 1222-
23; Camps, 32 F.3d at 107-08 ("Just as the Harrison Act proscribed each separate drug sale, and
not the business of selling drugs, so too [section 924(c)] prohibits each separate act of firearm
use or carriage, not violent crimes and drug trafficking with firearms.").
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whether the particular act referred to in the statute is of a discrete or
continuing nature.62  Because section 924(c), by its very terms,
prohibits the "use" of a firearm, not "engaging in the use" of a firearm,
the dissent reasoned that the statute criminalizes an individual act
rather than a course of conduct. 63  Consequently, a complete section
924(c) violation occurs each time a defendant uses a firearm, even
where separate and distinct uses occurred during the commission of a
single underlying felony.
The dissent then turned to legislative history and policy con-
siderations. One comment by Representative Poff warned the poten-
tial violator of section 924(c) that "if he uses his gun and is caught
and convicted, he is going to jail" and "if he does so a second time, he
is going to jail for a longer time."64 The dissent viewed this intent to
increase the punishment with subsequent uses of the firearm as evi-
dence that section 924(c) cannot be limited to a single application per
offense.65 Such a limitation would not only fail adequately to deter
criminals from using firearms to commit crime, but also provide them
with an incentive to continue to employ a firearm after the first use.66
Finally, the dissent dismissed the rule of lenity as inapplicable
to the specific question of interpretation. It agreed that there is
ambiguity lurking in section 924(c), but not with respect to whether a
defendant can violate the statute more than once during a single
underlying felony. Instead, the ambiguity stems from the difficulty of
The Anderson dissent, however, buttressed this analysis with a discussion of other cases
that dealt with the same issue of multiple convictions. 59 F.3d at 1337 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). In one of the cases, the Supreme Court held that a defendant could be convicted
only once under a statute that provided "if any male person... cohabits with more than one
woman, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," because the offense was "inherently[] a
continuous offense.., not an offense consisting of an isolated act." In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274,
281 (1887). In another case, the Court did allow multiple convictions under the federal mail
fraud statute which provided: 'If any person... shall, in and for executing [any] scheme or
artifice .... place any letter or packet in any post-office of the United States, such
person... shall be [punished]." In re Henry, 123 U.S. 372, 373 (1887). The Court held that
"[e]ach letter so... put in constitutes a separate and distinct violation of the act." Id. at 374
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625, 629 (1915)
(allowing multiple convictions under a statute providing that "[w]hoever shall tear, cut, or
otherwise injure any mailbag... shall be fined," when the defendant cut several mailbags
during the same criminal episode).
62. Anderson, 59 F.3d at 1337 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1339 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 22,231 (July 19, 1968)).
65. Id. at 1339 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent fleshed out its argument by stating that
"once a drug conspirator has used his gun once in furtherance of the conspiracy, he may as well
use, carry, display, brandish, and fire his weapon throughout the conspiracy, for no matter what
he does with his firearm, he can be punished under [section 924(c)] for only one use." Id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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determining when one use ends and a separate use begins.6 7 While it
may be appropriate to resolve such ambiguity in favor of the defen-
dant, the dissent reasoned that allowing only one section 924(c) viola-
tion even where separate uses have been proven would violate the
plain meaning of the statute.6 8
IV. LIFTING THE FOG
A. More Than a Penalty Enhancement
At first glance, section 924(c) appears to be a penalty en-
hancement, 69 and some courts have characterized it as such.70 If
section 924(c) simply provides an enhanced punishment for a defen-
dant who uses a gun to commit another crime, it is unquestionable
that only one violation of the statute could be linked to a single predi-
cate offense71 An overwhelming amount of evidence, however, estab-
lishes that section 924(c) proscribes a separate and distinct criminal
offense.
The statute provides that the underlying felony need only to be
one for which the defendant "may be prosecuted in a court of the
United States. 2 It also imposes a greater sentence for a "second or
67. Id. at 1341 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
69. Section 924 is entitled 'Penalties," and its subsections provide penalties for firearms
offenses established in other sections. The punishment for a violation of section 924(c) is "in
addition to the punishment' imposed for the underlying felony, and a conviction under the
statute requires proof of the commission of that felony. Hill, 971 F.2d at, 1463.
70. See, for example, Hamilton, 953 F.2d at 1346 (referring to section 924(c) as an
"enhanced penalty provision"); Henning, 906 F.2d at 1399 (stating that section 924(c) "is an
enhancement statute"). The Supreme Court has contributed to the confusion, stating that the
statute "authorizes the imposition of enhanced penalties on a defendant who uses or carries a
firearm while committing a federal felony.' Busic, 446 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).
71. The United States Sentencing Guidelines direct district courts, in some circumstances,
to enhance a defendant's offense level, and thereby the sentence imposed, according to certain
characteristics of the offense. See, for example, United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A)-(B) (Nov. 1994) (establishing offense level increases for
specific actions involving the use of firearms or other dangerous weapons during the commission
of a robbery). Double jeopardy principles, however, prevent courts from using a particular
sentence enhancement more than once; otherwise courts would be able to impose multiple
punishments for the same conduct. See United States v. Haines, 32 F.3d 290, 293 (7th Cir.
1994) ('Impermissible double counting occurs when a district court imposes two or more upward
adjustments within the guidelines range, when both are premised on the same conduct.").
72. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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subsequent conviction under this subsection.' 3 A long line of deci-
sions interpreting the statute further establishes that a violation of
section 924(c) is a separate offense. For example, it is not necessary
to convict a defendant of the underlying felony in order to convict him
for a section 924(c) violation;74 it is not even necessary to charge a
defendant with the underlying crime.75 A defendant may be convicted
for conspiring to violate section 924(c).76 Finally, one court has even
held that venue for section 924(c) charges lies where the use of the
firearm occurred, not the site of the underlying offense. 77
The legislative history of section 924(c) and subsequent statu-
tory enactments also demonstrate that the section makes out a sepa-
rate crime. Representative Poff stated that the statute would create
"a separate Federal crime... and invoke[] separate and supplemen-
tal penalties."8 Those penalties "were not addressed to the base fel-
ony" but were instead addressed "to the use of a firearm in the com-
mission of the base felony." 79 Moreover, reports of both houses of
Congress produced during consideration of amendments to section
924(c) are consistent with this vision of the statute, 0 and Congress
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. United States v. Robertson, 901 F.2d 737, 738 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990).
75. United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1989).
76. Hill, 971 F.2d at 1467. In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 924(n) provides:
A person who conspires to commit an offense under subsection (c) shall be imprisoned
for not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both; and if the firearm is a ma-
chinegun or destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or muffler, shall be
imprisoned for any term of years or life.
77. United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1994). But see United States v.
Pomranz, 43 F.3d 156, 161 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a defendant indicted for violating
section 924(c) may be prosecuted in the same venue as that for the underlying drug trafficking
offense).
78. 114 Cong. Rec. 22,231 (July 19, 1968). The Supreme Court has stated that "[a]lthough
these remarks are of course not dispositive of the issue of [section 924(c)'s] reach, they are
certainly entitled to weight, coming as they do from the provision's sponsor." Simpson, 435 U.S.
at 13.
79. 114 Cong. Rec. 30,583 (Oct. 10, 1968). Furthermore, Senator Mansfield, in an attempt
to clarify that a second violation would result in a mandatory consecutive sentence, stated that
"this bill provides for the first time a separate and additional penalty for the mere act of choos-
ing to use or carry a gun in committing a crime under Federal law. If that choice is made more
than once, the offender can in no way avoid a prison sentence regardless of the circumstances."
115 Cong. Rec. 34,838 (Nov. 19, 1969) (emphasis added). Clearly, Congress was focusing on the
use of the gun, not the predicate offense.
80. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 312, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3182, 3490 (stating that section 924(c) "sets out an
offense distinct from the underlying felony and is not simply a penalty provision"); Federal
Firearms Law Reform Act of 1986, H.R. Rep. No. 99-495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1336 (stating that "[a]lthough the provision ... is frequently referred
to as a penalty enhancement provision it is in reality a separate offense from crimes of
violence"). Both of these reports cited the Supreme Court's statement that section 924(c) is "an
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has even created specific penalties for deaths resulting from a section
924(c) violation.8'
It is clear that violation of section 924(c) is a criminal offense
distinct from the underlying felony. Standing alone, however, this
factor appears insufficient to establish that each discrete use of a
firearm is the proper unit of prosecution.
B. Prohibition of a Discrete Act
Recognizing that section 924(c) defines a separate and distinct
criminal offense weighs heavily in favor of the separate use interpre-
tation of the statute. A defendant violates section 924(c), just as he
would any other statute, each time he commits the prohibited act of
using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to the underlying
felony. Section 924(c), then, should be directed toward each separate
use of a firearm, rather than a course of conduct. Courts holding that
a defendant may only violate section 924(c) once per underlying crime
come dangerously close to interpreting the statute as nothing more
than a penalty enhancement.
Nothing in the language or structure of section 924(c) as it is
written---"whoever uses a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime"-establishes that a defendant may
only violate the statute once.82 Interpreting section 924(c) to reach
that conclusion essentially rewrites the statute to read "whoever
commits a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime with a firearm"
shall be punished.8 3 Such a revision closely resembles the version of
section 924(c) that was offered in the Senate but rejected by the
Conference Committee.84
offense distinct from the underlying federal felony." Simpson, 435 U.S. at 10. See S. Rep. No.
98-225 at 312 n.1 (cited in this note); H.R. Rep. No. 99-495 at 10 n.7 (cited in this note).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 924(i) (providing punishment for a "person who, in the course of a violation
of [section 924(c)], causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm").
82. See Camps, 32 F.3d at 109 ("We would not say.., that a provision imposing increased
penalties for 'committing murder, rape, or larceny during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime' could not be violated more than once during a lengthy drug conspiracy.").
83. Anderson, 59 F.3d at 1338 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
84. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text. Under the Senate measure, unlike the one
offered by Representative Poft "[n]o new crime would be created." 114 Cong. Rec. 27,142
(September 17, 1968). Rather, the measure would have provided "an added penalty ... for an
individual who is armed with any type of firearm while engaged in a Federal crime of violence."
Id. The rejection of this version is further evidence that section 924(c) makes out a new crime.
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The Anderson court's textual arguments also fail to provide
meaningful support for the predicate offense test.85 The court's em-
phasis on the use of definite articles in the penalty clauses relating to
specific types of firearms is misplaced.86 It is likely that Congress, by
providing special penalties if "the firearm is a machinegun," is refer-
ring to the particular firearm that was used or carried in a particular
violation of section 924(c). The court likewise infers too much from
the juxtaposition of "uses" and "carries. '' 87 Contrary to its assertion
that "carries" only implies a continuing activity, it may, in fact, be
easier to find that a defendant who takes up his firearm on two
separate occasions during the same underlying crime has "carried"
that firearm more than once than it is to decide whether he has
"used" it more than once. 88
The purpose of section 924(c), deterrence of the use of fire-
arms,8 9 lends additional weight to the argument that a defendant
violates the statute each time he uses a firearm during the commis-
sion of the predicate offense. Interpreting the statute as criminalizing
a course of conduct rather than each discrete use of a firearm pre-
vents section 924(c) from achieving its full deterrent effect, and si-
multaneously creates perverse incentives for potential offenders.
Under this interpretation, the statute would not deter any use of a
firearm after the first use because the defendant could be punished
for only one use.90 Once a criminal uses his firearm once during the
commission of the underlying felony, therefore, he may as well dis-
play, brandish, and fire his weapon on every possible occasion.91
This policy argument is especially compelling given the
Supreme Court's most recent construction of section 924(c) in Bailey
v. United States. 2 According to the Court, a defendant uses a firearm
in violation of section 924(c) only when he actively employs it during
the commission of the underlying felony93 by firing or attempting to
85. See Part III.C.2.
86. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
87. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
88. Anderson, 59 F.3d at 1336 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
89. See 114 Cong. Rec. 30,583 (Oct. 10, 1968) (statement of Representative Poff that
section 924(c) "was designed to persuade the man who has decided to set forth on a criminal
venture to leave his gun at home").
90. Anderson, 59 F.3d at 1339 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Camps, 32 F.3d at 108 ("If multiple uses of
extraordinarily dangerous weapons.., could not be punished with multiple consecutive
sentences, there would be little deterrence against armed drug dealers using those weapons
repeatedly during a lengthy drug conspiracy.").
92. 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995).
93. Id. at 505 (requiring "evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm
by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate
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fire, brandishing, displaying, bartering,94  or striking with the
firearm.9 5 Because section 924(c) singles out, as a distinct offense,
these particularly violent uses of a firearm, it seems clear that the
statute provides punishment for each separate use. Thus, it is nearly
incomprehensible that Congress intended only to punish a course of
conduct.
C. Faulty Precedent
Analysis in early cases propounding the predicate offense test
is also unconvincing. The Tenth Circuit first addressed the imposi-
tion of multiple sentences under section 924(c) in United States v.
Chalan.9 The defendant, who shot and killed the manager of a con-
venience store during a robbery, was convicted of robbery, felony
murder, and two section 924(c) violations based on the single firearm
use.9 7  On appeal, the court vacated one of the section 924(c)
convictions, holding that the predicate offenses constituted a single
offense for double jeopardy purposes, and, therefore, a single crime of
violence within the meaning of section 924(c).91 As a result, the
number of permissible violations of the statute was linked to the
number of distinct underlying felonies. This holding, however, does
not support the position that multiple underlying felonies are
necessary to support multiple section 924(c) violations. 99
offense"). In particular, the Court held that "the inert presence of a firearm, without more, is
not enough to trigger [section 924(c)]." Id. at 508. To hold otherwise would create such a broad
reading of "uses" that "carries" would no longer have a "meaningful role" in the statute. Id. at
507.
94. The inclusion of bartering may seem odd, but the Court had previously found such
conduct to violate section 924(c) in Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2060, 124 L. Ed. 2d
138 (1993).
95. Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 508. Other less obvious violative conduct includes an offender's
reference to a firearm in his possession or the "silent but obvious and forceful presence of a gun
on a table." Id.
96. 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987).
97. Id. at 1315.
98. Id. at 1317. The court noted that "first-degree murder and robbery would constitute
separate offenses if the first-degree murder conviction were premised on something other than
robbery-for example, premeditation or kidnapping," because different facts would be needed to
convict on both counts. Id. at 1316. Because Congress had not clearly expressed its intent
regarding how to apply section 924(c) in such situations, the court invoked the rule of lenity. Id.
at 1317.
99. Even advocates of the separate use interpretation of section 924(c) recognize that the
predicate offense "may be an appropriate unit of account where the prosecution seeks convic-
tions on two or more [section 924(c)] counts for the use of a single gun on a single occasion by
linking [them] to nominally separate offenses that are not in fact separable for double jeopardy
purposes." Anderson, 39 F.3d at 355 (panel decision).
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Later, the Ninth Circuit relied upon Chalan when it addressed
the imposition of multiple section 924(c) sentences in United States v.
Fontanilla.100 The defendant, while on a bus going to work, opened
fire on the passengers, killing one and wounding another. 101 He was
convicted of murder, assault, and two violations of section 924(c).112
The court affirmed both section 924(c) convictions, holding that
"[b]ecause the murder and assault were properly charged as separate
crimes, it was permissible to charge the [defendant] with a separate
firearm charge for each crime."10 3 No court, however, has ever ques-
tioned that multiple section 924(c) violations may be linked to sepa-
rate predicate offenses. Nevertheless, later courts used Fontanilla as
a stepping-stone to the conclusion that multiple section 924(c) viola-
tions must be supported by separate underlying felonies. 104
In most of those cases, there was not more than one separate
and distinct use of a firearm related to the commission of a single
underlying crime. Instead, they generally involved section 924(c)
violations based on multiple guns found in a single cache. 0 5 The
courts, in fact, never addressed the separate use interpretation, focus-
ing solely upon refuting the "separate guns" interpretation.0 6 Courts
that rely on these cases as precedential support for the predicate
offense test, therefore, state their holdings overbroadly. The cases do
not foreclose the separate use interpretation.0 7
100. 849 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
101. Id. at 1257.
102. Id. at 1258.
103. Id. at 1259 (emphasis added).
104. See, for example, Henry, 878 F.2d at 942-45.
105. See, for example, Privette, 947 F.2d at 1262 ("[U]se of more than one gun will not
support multiple counts under [section 924(c)] for use of a firearm during a single drug
trafficking crime."); Henning, 906 F.2d at 1399 (holding that "where a defendant has been
convicted of a single drug trafficking offense and more than one firearm was involved, a single
violation of [section 924(c)] occurs and multiple consecutive sentences may not be stacked to
account for each firearm seized"); Cappas, 29 F.3d at 1189 (holding that "the use of multiple
guns in a single drug conspiracy will not support multiple convictions under [section 924(c)]").
106. See, for example, Lindsay, 985 F.2d at 674 (stating that Congress "considered the
appropriate unit of prosecution to be the underlying drug-trafficking offense, not the separate
firearms") (emphasis added); Taylor, 13 F.3d at 994 (holding that section 924(c)'s "unit of prose-
cution is the underlying offense, not the number of firearms") (emphasis added). But see
Anderson, 59 F.3d at 1326-34 (directly addressing and rejecting the separate use interpretation
of section 924(c)).
107. The predicate offense test, however, is appropriate where more than one gun is used
for the same purpose. See Anderson, 39 F.3d at 356 (panel decision) (recognizing without
opinion that the predicate offense may be the proper unit of prosecution "where more than one
gun is used to protect a stash of drugs in a single location"). The fundamental holding of the
separate guns interpretation is that section 924(c) "authorizes prosecution for the possession of
each firearm a defendant possesses during and in relation to a single crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime." Freisinger, 937 F.2d at 390 (emphasis added). That reasoning is particularly




No other statutory impediments exist to the prosecution of a
defendant for each separate and distinct use of a firearm during the
commission of a single underlying felony. The Supreme Court, inter-
preting the second or subsequent convictions clause of section 924(c),
has held that multiple convictions for violations of the statute, and
the imposition of multiple sentences, may occur in a single prosecu-
tion.10s Therefore, in light of the separate use interpretation, if the
government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant
used a firearm on two or more separate occasions during the course of
a single predicate offense,109 nothing precludes it from prosecuting and
convicting him for multiple violations of section 924(c).
V. CONCLUSION
Careful interpretation of the text and purpose of section 924(c)
leads to the conclusion that a person violates the statute each time he
uses a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or a drug
trafficking crime, even when those uses relate to the same underlying
offense. This descriptive conclusion, however, is accompanied by
normative considerations concerning the application of section 924(c).
The government not only may seek to prosecute for multiple viola-
tions of the statute when they exist, it should seek to prosecute them.
Such an approach could prove an invaluable companion to, or perhaps
even replacement of, other forms of gun control in an effort to curb
violent crime. Punishment for violating section 924(c) specifically
addresses the conduct that society seeks to deter-the criminal em-
108. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993). This case did not present the Court with
an opportunity to resolve the question in this Note because Deal was convicted of several
underlying felonies and each charged violation of section 924(c) was specifically linked to a
separate underlying felony.
109. The Anderson majority argued that "it would surely prove devilishly difficult analyti-
cally" to determine when a defendant has engaged in a separate "use" or "carry" during an
ongoing conspiracy. 59 F.3d at 1331. As the government suggested in Anderson, however, the
problem "really is no different than determining, in an 'assault case, for example, whether a
series of blows struck upon the same victim during an altercation (or other
crime)... constitutes one continuing 'assault or several discrete (and separately punishable)
assaults." Appellee's Brief for the In Banc Court at 30, United States v. Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (on file with the Author).
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ployment of firearms"-and removes dangerous criminals from the
streets for substantial periods of time. Accordingly, the proper use of
section 924(c) benefits law enforcement and society.
Christopher L. Robbins*
110. In this way, section 924(c) achieves its purpose, as stated by Representative Poff, to
"target[] upon the criminal rather than the gun." 114 Cong. Rec. 22,231 (July 19, 1968).
* Many thanks to Professor Donald J. Hall for his helpful comments on early drafts of
this Note; Assistant United States Attorney Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., for sharing his insights and
alerting me to the existence of important statutes and case law; and the editorial staff of the
Vanderbilt Law Review for their hard work and dedication.
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